Accuracy of previous forecast
Compared to my forecast, the left did poorly. I had expected 50% and they received 47%. (I have included V, FI, S, MP in the calculation.) The right (KD, C, FP, M) performed as expected. The nationalists (SD) received 13% compared to an expected 10%. (All data rebased on the share of the top eight parties. All parties are described as left-wing or right-wing. Swedish politics is organised into three camps; the left-wing (socialists), the right-wing (non-socialists), and the nationalists.)
New forecast until 2026
I have updated the forecast for the next three elections. A few comments on methodology (see also the original forecast made in January)
1. I have used voting intentions per age and gender group (source: SCB partisympatiundersokning). Due to demographic changes (i.e. age and immigration), this changes the composition of the electorate. This shift will favour certain parties (e.g. MP, FI) and hurt other parties (e.g. C, KD).
2. I have assumed that all new voters will vote the same as the current 18-25 year old voters. Young voters are more left than right. Given that 60%-80% of opinion leaders (i.e. journalists and teachers) vote left, I think this is a reasonable assumption.
3. I have assumed that the nationalists will receive 17% in 2026. This is a big unknown.
Note that this is a status-quo forecast. Within the forecast period the parties are likely to endogenously make changes to their strategies, which invalidates the forecast. However, the status-quo forecast still shows the underlying structural forces at play.
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| Figure 1. |
The key dilemma for the right-wing parties
The right-wing parties face a huge problem going forward because their voters are not being replaced in the same speed as their voters are dying. The four party leaders have strongly stated that they will never cooperate with the nationalists. Unless there is a change, I expect them to loose all three elections in the forecast period. Given the posturing of the right-wing, the current generation of leaders can hardly change their opinion.
After another loss in 2018, new leaders might be in place 2020. They might start talking to the nationalists before the 2022 election. Whether there will be some kind of cooperation after 2022 depends on the election results in that year. The longer the right-wing waits to initiate cooperation, the worse their bargaining position will be.
However, in 2022 the left-wing will have strengthened due to demographics so they might end up with an absolute majority. Any talk between the right-wing and the nationalists might also scare some voters into the left-wing camp.
However, in 2022 the left-wing will have strengthened due to demographics so they might end up with an absolute majority. Any talk between the right-wing and the nationalists might also scare some voters into the left-wing camp.
Other issues
It is very likely that FI will surpass the 4% floor for representation in parliament in 2018. FI will most likely grow at the expense of the other left-wing parties. Expect to see a lot of gender equality focus among the other parties. Still, I expect FI will get into the parliament in 2018. Their leader is a PR genius, despite being a former revolutionary Communist. They are mostly taking votes from the other left-wing parties so this will not change the left/right balance.
It is very likely that KD will fall short of the 4% floor in 2022 or 2026. Most of their voters are older than 55 years. Expect the party to disintegrate. FP, M, and SD will pick up the votes.
Given the posturing, it is unlikely that any political party would accept any of the proposals about immigration form the nationalist party during the next eight years. In fact they might even reject proposals they would like due to a felt guilt-by-association. Expect no discussion about the immigration policy (size, required level of assimilation) before 2018. Expect some careful discussion about level of assimilation after the 2018 election. Everyone will be careful to exclude the nationalists from the discussions. After the 2022 election, I expect a much more open discussion about the problem.
Given the posturing, it is unlikely that any political party would accept any of the proposals about immigration form the nationalist party during the next eight years. In fact they might even reject proposals they would like due to a felt guilt-by-association. Expect no discussion about the immigration policy (size, required level of assimilation) before 2018. Expect some careful discussion about level of assimilation after the 2018 election. Everyone will be careful to exclude the nationalists from the discussions. After the 2022 election, I expect a much more open discussion about the problem.
It is possible that the left-wing will temporary lose voter support due to mismanagement. They will form a minority government in 2015 and they are not used to governing together. However, their structural benefit remains so the situation will not be fatal in the long term. It is also unlikely that they would loose so much that they become smaller than the combined right-wing parties.
I do not think it likely that the country will get a government with mix and match between some left-wing and some right-wing parties. There has not been any such stable government during the last 50 years. It is however possible that such a government would form as a response to a major crisis. Still I am pretty sure any cooperation will disappear after the crisis is over.
I do not think it likely that the country will get a government with mix and match between some left-wing and some right-wing parties. There has not been any such stable government during the last 50 years. It is however possible that such a government would form as a response to a major crisis. Still I am pretty sure any cooperation will disappear after the crisis is over.
The key uncertainty is how large the nationalists can become. They currently have 13%, but 20% of the electorate would prefer their immigration policies (source SVT exit poll). However, the proportion of the electorate that prefers the nationalist immigration policy has increased during the last ten years. Given the problems caused by the increased immigration flows from Syria, Iraq, and Somalia, it is very possible that the upper limit of the nationalist party will be in the 20-30% range within the forecast period. If that were the case, they would probably gain at the expense of both the left and the right. On the downside, I think it would be unlikely that they would get lower support than 13%. Voters for the nationalist party are stigmatised so it is likely that the new voters have gone through a lot of soul-searching before deciding. This makes it unlikely that they will desert the party easily. They have made a commitment for the long term. If they continue to play their cards well, they could become the second biggest party within eight years.
Finally, a wild-card would be the formation of an Islamist political party in Sweden. They will not be able to get 4% of the electorate today, but possibly in 2026. Since around 70% of the immigrants vote for the left-wing parties, this would redistribute votes within the left - just like FI is doing.
Finally, a wild-card would be the formation of an Islamist political party in Sweden. They will not be able to get 4% of the electorate today, but possibly in 2026. Since around 70% of the immigrants vote for the left-wing parties, this would redistribute votes within the left - just like FI is doing.
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